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One New President, One New
Patriarch,
and
a
Generous
Disregard for the Constitution: A
Recipe for the Continuing Decline
of Secular Russia
Robert C. Blitt*
ABSTRACT
The government of Russia and the Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC)—the country’s predominant religious group—
recently underwent back-to-back changes in each institution’s
respective leadership. This coincidence of timing affords a
unique opportunity to reassess the status of constitutional
secularism and church–state relations in the Russian
Federation.
Following a discussion of the presidential and patriarchal
elections that occurred between March 2008 and January 2009,
the Article surveys recent developments in Russia as they relate
to the nation’s constitutional obligations. In the face of this
analysis, the Article argues that the government and the ROC
alike continue to willfully undermine the constitutional
principles of secularism, nondiscrimination, and equality
through a variety of special privileges, cooperation agreements,
and legislative initiatives. These practices do not merely follow
but rather deepen the pattern developed under the leadership of
former President Vladimir Putin. The Article concludes that as
a consequence of the strengthened church–state relationship,
respect for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief,
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Professor Karla Simon of Catholic University of America for extending the opportunity
to present an early draft of this Article at a conference on freedom of religion in the
former Soviet Union. This Article would not have materialized without the kind
encouragement of Professor Dwight Aarons and the constant support of my colleagues
in Knoxville. Finally, thanks are due to Kate Gilchrist and the editors at the
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law for their accurate edits and rapid turnaround
time in bringing this Article to print.
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as well as freedom of expression will continue to wane, resulting
in a further deterioration of the human rights crisis in Russia
and of the foundation of Russia’s constitutional order.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The government of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church
(ROC)1—the country’s predominant religious group—recently
underwent back-to-back changes in each institution’s respective
leadership. This coincidence of timing affords an opportunity to take
a fresh look at the status of constitutional secularism and church–
state relations in the Russian Federation.
After a discussion of the presidential and patriarchal elections
that occurred in March 2008 and January 2009 respectively, this

1.
The terms Russian Orthodox Church, ROC, Russian Church, the Church,
and Orthodox Church are used interchangeably herein to refer to the Moscow
Patriarchate.
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Article surveys recent developments in Russia and assesses their
impact on the nation’s constitutional obligations. Next, the Article
argues that both the government and the ROC continue to willfully
undermine
the
constitutional
principles
of
secularism,
nondiscrimination, and equality through a variety of special
privileges, cooperation agreements, and legislative initiatives.
Furthermore, the Article contends that these practices do not merely
follow, but rather deepen, the pattern previously developed under the
leadership of former President Vladimir Putin.2
The Article
concludes that, as a consequence of the strengthened church–state
relationship, respect for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
or belief, and freedom of expression will likely continue to wane,
resulting in a further deterioration of the human rights crisis in
Russia3 and of the foundation of Russia’s constitutional order.4
II. WINDS OF CHANGE? ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND PATRIARCH
During Vladimir Putin’s two terms as president, most of the
informed opinion regarding relations between the Russian
government and the ROC agreed that the relationship challenged
Russia’s official constitutional secularism: the two institutions shared
tightened ties5 and “common values”6 that signaled a growing
“strategic alliance.”7 As a consequence, the ROC grew “increasingly
powerful”8 and “State support for the church [grew] even stronger.”9

2.
See Robert C. Blitt, How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia,
2008 BYU L. REV. 707, 736–37.
3.
For a general overview of recent human rights developments under
Medvedev’s presidency, see Medvedev’s First Year: Failure to Improve Human Rights,
AMNESTY INT’L (May 8, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/
medvedevs-first-year-failure-improve-human-rights-20090508.
4.
“Man, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value. The recognition,
observance and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be the
obligation of the State.” KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 2 (Russ.).
5.
A New Patriarch for the Russian Orthodox Church, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/news/religion/articles/2009/01/28/a-newpatriarch-for-the-russian-orthodox-church.html?PageNr=1.
6.
John Anderson, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric
Symphonia?, 61 J. INT’L AFF. 185, 198 (2007).
7.
Russia—Media Say Church Divided on Choice of Patriarch, U.S. OPEN
SOURCE CTR., Jan. 23, 2009 [hereinafter Media Say Church Divided].
8.
Tony Halpin, Russian Orthodox Church Choses [sic] Between ‘ex-KGB
Candidates’
as
Patriarch,
TIMES
ONLINE
(London),
Jan.
26,
2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article5594067.ece.
9.
Oleg Shchedrov, Putin Promises Support to Russian Orthodox Church,
REUTERS, Nov. 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL196077120071119.
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Furthermore, the ROC enjoyed a “favoured status,”10 “edg[ing] ever
closer to [the] state,”11 and “in many areas . . . turned . . . into a de
facto official religion.”12 From the perspective of other observers, the
church–state relationship morphed into an “unholy alliance”13
whereby the ROC increasingly became “a symbol and projection of
Russian nationalism”14 and “an extension of the state,”15 subordinate
to “the Putin regime. . . . as an even stronger supporter of
dictatorship and anti-Western ideology.”16
This situation continued until March 2008, when presidential
candidate Dmitry Medvedev scored an “overwhelming victory” in an
election described as “more coronation than contest.”17 At this point,
preliminary signs indicated that Medvedev would continue President
Putin’s relationship with the Church.18 Although many viewed the
presidential election as an example of “managed democracy,” whereby
Russia’s electorate merely validated a choice already predetermined
by the Kremlin,19 no one could have predicted that Alexy II, leader of
the Russian Orthodox Church since his appointment in 1990, would
die less than one year later20 and leave the position of Patriarch an
open race.21
Upon learning of the Patriarch’s passing, Medvedev, abroad in
India and only seven months into his presidency, canceled a planned

10.
Zoe Knox, The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet
Leadership, 55 EUR.–ASIA STUD. 575, 575 (2003).
11.
Russian Orthodox Church Edges Ever Closer to State, SOUTHEAST
MISSOURIAN, Jan. 22, 2000, at 4-B.
12.
Clifford J. Levy, At Expense of All Others, Putin Picks a Church, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at A1; see also Lawrence Uzzell, Advancing Freedom of Belief in
Russia, in THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN RUSSIA 165, 167 (William J. Vanden Heuvel ed.,
2000) (dispelling the notion of overt religious persecution in modern Russia, but
embracing the depiction of a repressive Russian religious state).
13.
Adrian Blomfield, Orthodox Church Unholy Alliance with Putin,
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 23, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
1579638/Orthodox-Church-unholy-alliance-with-Putin.html.
14.
Yuri Zarakhovich, Putin’s Reunited Russian Church, TIME, May 17, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1622544,00.html.
15.
Dmitri Trenin, Russia Reborn: Reimagining Moscow’s Foreign Policy, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 64, 75 (2009).
16.
David Satter, Putin Runs the Russian State—And the Russian Church Too,
FORBES, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/20/putin-solzhenitsyn-kirillrussia-opinions-contributors_orthodox_church.html.
17.
Peter Finn, Putin’s Chosen Successor, Medvedev, Elected in Russia, WASH.
POST, Mar. 3, 2008, at A11.
18.
Blitt, supra note 2, at 773–78.
19.
See Fred Weir, Russian Election: Medvedev Set to Become President in
Sunday Vote, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 29, 2008, at 4.
20.
Tony Halpin, Patriarch Alexiy II, Head of Russian Orthodox Church, Dies,
TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/
article5291723.ece.
21.
See Yuri Zarakhovich, Russian Orthodox Church Loses Its Leader, TIME, Dec. 5,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1864769,00.html.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1649556

2010]

A Recipe for the Continuing Decline of Secular Russia

1341

visit to Italy and returned forthwith to Russia.22 A statement
released by the Kremlin expressed the President’s feelings: “A very
grievous event has happened in the life of this country, our society—
Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexiy II has died.”23 Medvedev
declared Alexy’s funeral a day of national mourning.24 He also signed
a decree requiring cultural institutions and television and radio
stations to “cancel entertainment events and programs on the day of
the patriarch’s burial.”25 Finally, Medvedev ordered national media
to provide live coverage of the almost eight-hour long funeral
ceremony,26 including “people bidding farewell to the patriarch.”27
At Alexy’s funeral service—attended by Medvedev, Putin, and
other officials from the Kremlin and Duma—Metropolitan Kirill of
Smolensk and Kaliningrad—the ROC’s locum tenens (interim leader)
eulogized the departed Patriarch: “Today his Holiness, standing
before the face of God, can say that he left us with a different Church:
no longer powerless and weak.”28 Press accounts concluded that the
ceremony confirmed “the elevation of the Russian Orthodox Church to
de-facto state religion.”29 After Alexy’s burial, the Church Council
turned to the task of electing a new patriarch. This demanding
process, during which potential candidates customarily forgo
declaring their interest in the post, requires a preliminary selection of
three candidates, followed by a vote by a 750-member body consisting
of clergy and lay people.30 Despite his high-profile position as locum
tenens, Kirill was, by many accounts, not a shoo-in for the revered
post.31 Numerous observers claimed that the Kremlin favored
Metropolitan Kliment, “the standard-bearer of traditionalists” as

22.
Sophia Kishkovsky, Patriarch Aleksy II, Russian Orthodox Leader, Dies at
Age 79, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, at A19.
23.
Halpin, supra note 20.
24.
Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Leaders Attend Patriarch’s Funeral, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at A16.
25.
Media Say Church Divided, supra note 7; see also Yulia Taratuta & Pavel
Korobov, Russian Church to Elect New Patriarch, KOMMERSANT (Moscow), Dec. 8,
2008, at 1 (discussing Alexy’s political legacy).
26.
Alexander Osipovich, Russia Buries First Post-Communist Church Leader,
AFP, Dec. 10, 2008.
27.
Media Say Church Divided, supra note 7.
28.
Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexy II Laid to Rest, RIA NOVOSTI (Moscow),
Dec. 9, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081209/118772112.html.
29.
E.g., Osipovich, supra note 26.
30.
Media Say Church Divided, supra note 7. Less than half of the individuals
who voted on the new Patriarch were citizens of the Russian Federation. Archpriest
Vsevolod Chaplin, now director of the Moscow Patriarchate’s External Affairs
Department, observed, “citizens of the Russian Federation will certainly form less than
half [of the delegates] as far as it is now possible to calculate.” Paul Goble, Will
Foreigners Elect the Next Russian Patriarch?, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Jan.
15, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/Will_Foreigners_Elect_Next_Russian_Patriarch/
1370089.html.
31.
E.g., Halpin, supra note 8.
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more “willing to be subservient” to the government’s interests.32
According to this view, a victory for Kliment would signal the Church
“tightly follow[ing] the Kremlin line” and ensure continuation of “the
church’s friendship with the state . . . with its previous force.”33
Indeed, as President, Putin passed over Kirill and instead appointed
Kliment to Russia’s Public Chamber,34 an advisory body to the
President that consists of representatives from Russian civil society.
In a similar slight at Medvedev’s inauguration in the Kremlin’s
Andreyevsky Hall, “Metropolitan Kliment sat in the front row next to
Alexy while Metropolitan Kirill was relegated to the back.”35
As the inevitable but subtle electioneering and requisite
controversies among various factions of the Church unfolded, Kirill
asserted his opposition “to any church reforms,” in an effort to
counter critics who alleged he was too liberal.36 Ultimately, the
Metropolitan, whether because of his high profile as a TV personality
or as locum tenens, vanquished Kliment, securing election as the 16th
Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.37 To cement the vote, on
February 1, 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin (standing prominently near the front),38
alongside other government officials waited with bated breath in
Moscow’s Christ the Savior Cathedral as bells chimed for fifteen
minutes before Kirill arrived in a limousine for his enthronement
ceremony.39 Like Alexy’s funeral, Russian television provided live
coverage of the ceremony.40 Although Putin did not give a speech, he
and other dignitaries lined up to congratulate the new Patriarch and

32.
Id.
33.
Media Say Church Divided, supra note 7 (quoting coverage from several
news outlets) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34.
Id.
35.
Nabi Abdullaev, Two Names Top List to Lead Church, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, available at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&
story_id=27789. However, this is not to say Kirill is entirely without his own backing in
the Russian capital. See Irina Filatova, The Politicking Patriarch, GUARDIAN (London),
Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/feb/02/russiareligion-patriarch-orthodox-kirill (discussing Kirill’s close ties with Russian political,
intelligence, and business interests).
36.
Media Say Church Divided, supra note 7 (quoting Metropolitan Kirill)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
37.
Filatova, supra note 35. Kirill won 508 votes out of 702. Id.
38.
Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Leaders Attend Installation of Orthodox
Patriarch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at A8.
39.
Russian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/Content/Russian_Orthodox_
Church_Enthrones_New_Patriarch/1377392.html.
40.
Id.
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kissed Kirill’s crucifix.41 Svetlana Medvedeva, Russia’s First Lady,
was first in line to receive communion from Kirill.42
In a speech delivered after his enthronement, Patriarch Kirill
offered thanks to Putin and Medvedev.43 President Medvedev
declared the enthronement
an outstanding event in the life of our country and of all Orthodox
nations—an event that opens a new chapter in the development of
Orthodox religion in our country, and which, hopefully, creates new
conditions for a fully-fledged and solidarity dialogue between the
Russian Orthodox Church and the state.44

A day later, as if to demonstrate his commitment to fostering these
“new conditions,” Medvedev invited the newly enthroned Patriarch—
as “his first duty as head of the Russian Orthodox Church”45—to lead
a service in the Kremlin’s Assumption Cathedral.46 After the service,
at a reception in Georgy Hall for ROC Local Council delegates, both
Kirill and Medvedev addressed the assembled religious leaders.47
Medvedev’s speech stressed that
relations between church and state are built on the foundation of the
constitutional principles of freedom of conscience and worship and nonintervention by the state authorities in religious organisations’
activities, and at the same time, on the state authorities’ recognition of
the Church’s great contribution to building Russia’s statehood,
developing its national culture and affirming spiritual and moral values
in society.48

Although Medvedev acknowledged that the Constitution
provides for freedom of conscience and separation of religious
associations from the state, he conspicuously omitted mention of
Article 14’s affirmation that the “Russian Federation shall be a
secular state” and religious associations “shall be equal before the

41.
42.

Russian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, AFP, Jan 31, 2009.
Leonid Sevastyanov & Robert Moynihan, 100 Days of Patriarch Kirill,
MOSCOW TIMES, May 18, 2009, available at http://rbth.ru/articles/2009/05/26/260509_
100days.html.
43.
Russian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, supra note 41.
44.
Medvedev: Kirill’s Enthronement Creates New Setting for Broader Dialogue
Between Church and State, INTERFAX (Moscow), Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.interfaxreligion.com/?act=news&div=5655 [hereinafter Dialogue Between Church and State].
45.
Kirill Conducts First Duty as Patriarch, RT, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://rt.com/Top_News/2009-02-02/Kirill_conducts_first_duty_as_Patriarch.html.
Georgy Hall is the “largest and most ceremonial hall of the Great Kremlin Palace.” The
Great Kremlin Palace, PRESIDENT OF RUSS. OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL,
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/atributesEng10.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
46.
Dialogue Between Church and State, supra note 44.
47.
Russian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, supra note 41.
48.
President Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at a Reception Given by the President
of Russia in Honour of Senior Clergy Who Took Part in the Russian Orthodox Church
Local Council (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/
2009/02/02/1738_type84779type127286_212 375.shtml.
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law.”49 In essence, Medvedev’s myopic and selective pronouncement
on church–state relations cast aside constitutional principles in favor
of the malleable mortar of “the Church’s great contribution to
building Russia’s statehood”—a contribution that has no basis or
authority in operative Russian law.
Faced with the death of one patriarch and the election of another
during his first year in office, President Medvedev missed two major
opportunities to take steps to redefine the controversial church–state
relationship charted during Putin’s previous two terms. Rather than
begin to remedy the profound infidelity to Russia’s constitutional
touchstone of secular rule, Medvedev appeared poised to follow the
status quo. Putin’s puppet or not, 50 Medvedev’s governance of
church–state relations since Kirill’s enthronement has further
weakened Russia’s Constitution and widened the chasm between
constitutional promise and practice. As a result, this chasm appears
virtually unbridgeable today.
III. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS UNDER MEDVEDEV IMPACTING
RUSSIA’S CHURCH–STATE RELATIONSHIP
The first half of Medvedev’s presidential term provides ample
illustration of the persistence of Putin’s disregard for secular rule and
religious equality under the law. Although some incidents might
strike the casual observer as quaint or innocuous, others pose grave
challenges to constitutional principles. Moreover, taken in toto, these
incidents and policies—quaint and grave alike—underscore that the
burgeoning relationship between Orthodoxy and the state effectively
displaces secular rule and forecloses the possibility of all religious
groups benefitting from the promise of nondiscrimination.

49.
KONST. RF art. 14.
50.
This is a debate that seems to waiver depending on who and when you ask.
See, e.g., Charles Clover, Russia: Shift to the Shadows, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at 8;
Clifford Levy, Russia’s Power (and Strictly Platonic) Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010,
at A12; Tom Parfitt, Putin and Medvedev Factions Locked in Kremlin Financial Power
Struggle, GUARDIAN, Mar. 3, 2009, at 15; Who’s the Boss Now?, NEWSWEEK, May 15,
2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2009/05/14/who-s-the-boss-now.html;
Gleb Bryanski, Russia’s Putin Steals Medvedev’s Show with Energy, REUTERS, June 18,
2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49417920100618; Henry Meyer, Putin,
Medvedev Diverge as Protégé Shows He Isn’t a ‘Puppet,’ BLOOMBERG, July 31, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3e.h8RHxsyw;
Simon
Tisdall, Medvedev’s New Dawn is a Distant Prospect, GUARDIAN, June 24, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/24/medvedev-modernisationbelarus-gas-dispute; Medvedev or Putin: Who Holds Real Power in Russia?,
VOANEWS.COM, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-10-16voa24-66600722.html.
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A. Small Favors for a Friend: A Constitutional Crisis?
1.

The Patriarch’s Flashing Blue Lights

One overt, if superficial, sign of the special status afforded to the
ROC is the flashing light (migalki) affixed to the Patriarch’s
automobile. Under a 2006 government decree, fewer than one
thousand Russian cars, which belong to senior officials, are supposed
to be equipped with special flashing lights intended to facilitate
navigation through traffic when “absolutely necessary.”51 However,
reports suggest that “the real figure is likely to be several times
higher as officials work the system, ordering several sirens for each
car,”52 and businessmen “bribe traffic police to obtain the coveted
flashing light.”53
Patriarch Kirill is the only religious leader, even among the
representatives of Russia’s so-called traditional religions, to enjoy the
privilege of a blue flashing light.54 Moreover, despite a recent
backlash against the migalki and some talk—in part due to traffic
fatalities—of restricting their use, Yuri Luzhkov, the recently
dismissed Mayor of Moscow,55 has asserted that only three people
should be allowed to use the blue light: “the President, the Prime
Minister, and the patriarch of the Orthodox Church.”56

51.
Alexander Bratersky, Angry Drivers Take Stand Against Flashing Blue
Lights, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
mobile/news/article/403336.html.
52.
Russia Mulls Ban on Private Cars Using Sirens and Flashing Lights,
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/
7612684/Russia-mulls-ban-on-private-cars-using-sirens-and-flashing-lights.html.
53.
Shaun Walker, Flashing Light Traffic Dodge Leaves Moscow’s Motorists
Screaming Blue Murder, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 21, 2010, at 30; see also Ruslan
Krivobok, Russian Drivers Protest Cars with Flashing Lights Breaking Road Rules,
RIA NOVOSTI, Apr. 15, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100415/158590009.html (“The
real number of special car signals exceeds the one that was established by the
government . . . [O]fficials get the additional lights from the traffic police or local
administration.”).
54.
Bratersky, supra note 51. For more on the division between “traditional”
and “nontraditional” religions in Russia, see Blitt, supra note 2, at 731–35; Wallace L.
Daniel & Christopher Marsh, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience in Context
and Retrospect, 49 J. CHURCH & ST. 5 (2007); Arina Lekhel, Leveling the Playing Field
for Religious “Liberty” in Russia: A Critical Analysis of the 1997 Law “On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations,” 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 167 (1999).
55.
Matthew Chance, Q&A: Sacked Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, CNN, Oct. 7,
2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/07/russia.moscow.mayor/index.html.
56.
Walker, supra note 53, at 30; Krivobok, supra note 53. Mayor Luzhkov is no
stranger to blurring the bright line between church and state: as co-chairman of Boris
Yeltsin’s reelection campaign, he approved the use of billboards around Moscow that
featured images of himself and Yeltsin “shaking hands against the glittering gold and
white backdrop of the Kremlin’s Ioann Lestivichnik church and belfry.” Alessandra
Stanley, Church Leans Toward Yeltsin in Russian Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1996, at
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Pay Your Earthly Debt, or You’re Going Straight to Hell

Flashing lights may be particularly handy for the Patriarch in
the context of a recent agreement struck between the state and the
Moscow Patriarchate. Confronted by the global financial crisis,
Russia’s Federal Court Marshals Service signed a deal with the
Church whereby ROC priests nationwide will denounce the failure to
repay debts, including “men dodging their alimony payments,”57 in
sermons and during private meetings with debtors organized by court
marshals.58 Russia’s Chief Bailiff, Artur Parfenchikov, observed that
the ROC “will exercise spiritual influence over the debtors to teach
them about the unacceptability of living in debt.”59 According to
another spokesperson for the Marshals, “[p]riests will say that unpaid
debt is the same as theft in Christianity.”60 This is not the first time
the ROC has mixed sermonizing with public policy. In December
2008, priests preached to unsuspecting scofflaws flagged down by
traffic police,61 despite the fact that Article 4(4) of Russia’s 1997 Law
on Freedom of Conscience—passed at the behest of the ROC—
mandates that:
The activity of agencies of state power and . . . local administration
[shall] not [be] accompanied by public religious rites and ceremonies.
Officials of state power, or of other state agencies, or of agencies of local
administration, as well as military figures, [shall] not have the right to
use their official status for advancing one or another religious
affiliation.62

Despite the government’s apparent inability to recall the operative
effect of this provision when using the priesthood to reinforce the
state’s debt collectors and traffic cops, it has an easier time granting

A5. Luzhkov also “recognized the political capital to be gained” by supporting the
rebuilding of Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Blitt, supra note 2, at 725.
57.
Russian Orthodox Priests to Help ‘Shame’ Debtors, AFP, June 24, 2009.
58.
Natalya Krainova, Church Calls on Debtors to Repay or Face Hell, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 26, 2009, available at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?
action_id=2&story_id=29343. The Moscow Patriarchate’s department on cooperation
with military forces and law enforcement agencies brokered the deal. Id.
59.
Russian Orthodox Priests to Help ‘Shame’ Debtors, supra note 57.
60.
Krainova, supra note 58. Reports indicate that the Marshals are in talks to
sign similar agreements with Muslim and Buddhist religious leaders as well. Id.
61.
Priests, Cops Fight Traffic Violation, AFP, Dec. 4, 2008
http://smh.drive.com.au/motor-news/priests-cops-fight-traffic-violation-2008120414638.html.
62.
O Svobode Sovesti i o Religioznikh Objedinenijah [On the Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations], art. 4(4), SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1997,
No. 39, Item 4465 (Federal Law No. 125–FZ) [hereinafter 1997 Law].
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binding effect to the law’s preamble, which sets up a distinction
between “traditional” and “nontraditional” religious groups.63
3.

A Nice Place Overlooking the Sea . . . on Protected State Land

When the Patriarch—flashing blue lights and all—needs to
escape Moscow’s temporal but vexing traffic jams, he too needs a
dacha getaway. Construction of a new summer residence near the
Black Sea resort city of Gelendzhik commenced during Alexy’s
tenure, following a land grant from the mayor of the village. A
German travel guide, The Russian Black Sea Coast: On the Road
Between Sochi and Anapa, describes this up-market and idyllic
location:
The hills running alongside the sea are covered by a [unique] forest, to
which the surrounding area owes its fantastic air. This forest is a
protected nature reserve. The new Russian elite therefore has already
begun to take possession of the area. The Patriarch of the Russian
church maintains [in absence mostly] a guesthouse on the coast
between Divnomorskoe and Dzanchot and President Putin has similar
plans to do the same.64

In 2003, local residents discovered that the land granted to the ROC
was situated on forestland protected under Russia’s 2001 Land
Code.65 According to Article 101 of the Land Code, removing
protected status for such plots “is permitted only in exceptional
cases.”66 These exceptional cases, specified under the Code, are
limited to situations where the state or municipality is implementing
“international commitments of the Russian Federation,” or acting for
a purpose of “state or local significance in the absence of other
options.”67
It is not immediately obvious how the transfer of protected land
to the Church might fulfill the narrow requirements stipulated under

63.
See id. For a discussion on the implications of this distinction, see infra
Part III.B.
64.
ANDREAS
STERNFELDT
&
BODO
THÖNS,
DIE
RUSSISCHE
SCHWARZMEERKÜSTE ENTDECKEN: UNTERWEGS ZWISCHEN SOTSCHI UND ANAPA (Detlev
von Oppeln ed., 2005).
65.
Yevgeniy Titov, ! "#$%&# ' ()*'+*, [To Putin in Swimwear], NOVAYA
GAZETA (Moscow), July 1, 2009, available at http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/
2009/069/01.html.
66.
Zemelnyi Kodeks ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [ZK] [Land Code] art. 101(3)
(Russ.) (repealed 2006) (“!"#$%&' "'(')*, "+,$%-. )'/+(& 0'1234 51600-, 7)$
53/67+1/%2',,-. &)& (6,&8&0+)*,-. ,697 7306/:+'%/$ %3)*:3 2 &/:);<&%')*,-. /)6<+$.,
01'76/(3%1',,-. 03706,:%+(& 1 & 2 06,:%+ 1 /%+%*& 49 ,+/%3$='53 >37':/+.”).
67.
Id. art. 49(1) (“!"#$%&', 2 %3( <&/)' 06%'( 2-:60+, "'(')*,-. 6<+/%:32 7)$
53/67+1/%2',,-. &)& (6,&8&0+)*,-. ,697 3/6='/%2)$'%/$ 2 &/:);<&%')*,-. /)6<+$.,
/2$"+,,-. /: [1] 2-03),',&'( ('976,+137,-. 3?$"+%')*/%2 @3//&4/:34 A'7'1+8&&; [2]
1+"('=',&'( 3?#':%32 53/67+1/%2',,353 &)& (6,&8&0+)*,353 ",+<',&$ 01& 3%/6%/%2&&
7165&. 2+1&+,%32 23"(39,353 1+"('=',&$ B%&. 3?#':%32.”).
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the law. However, even putting aside that question, the local
government went one step further by granting the transfer to the
ROC at no cost, rather than by sale or public auction. At least one
individual present at a town hall meeting protested the fact that the
Patriarch’s residence was proceeding without any environmental
impact study: “We are present at a farce. Everything has already
been put up, so what are we discussing? And how could a three story
building appear without an ecological expert test?”68 Despite these
issues, the local prosecutor’s office maintained that “there was no
violation” of the applicable law.69
4.

Flashing Lights and a Land Grant Do Not a State Church Make

One reaction to the developments outlined above may be: “So
what? Flashing lights and a land grant do not establish a state
church or even pose a challenge to the principle of secularism.” From
this perspective, any benefits—even those handed out exclusively to
the ROC—are more quaint than illustrative of a breakdown in
Russia’s constitutional principles of secularism and equality for all
religions. However, the reality is more complicated and troubling. In
practice, these examples demonstrate a consistent and pervasive
pattern of special treatment for the ROC, carried over and enlarged
under Medvedev’s rule. In addition, each instance carries potentially
negative implications for upholding respect for Russia’s Constitution.
For example, flashing lights for the Patriarch’s car are problematic
not only as discriminatory against other religions, but also as an
erosion of the government’s separation from religious associations.
It is even more troubling to consider what consequences might
follow from blending the coercive force of the state (embodied in the
traffic cop or court bailiff) with the Orthodox priesthood. The agent of
a specific religious denomination walking in lockstep with an agent of
the state in the course of carrying out state functions presents a clear
challenge to the constitutional obligation of secularism, but it also
forces a citizen—whether nonbeliever, Protestant, Catholic, or
Mormon—into an uncomfortable situation in which a specific
religious point of view appears to be sanctioned by the governing
authority.
Russia’s Constitution specifically guarantees that
“[n]obody shall be forced to express his thoughts and convictions or to
deny them.”70 However, if an Orthodox priest, with a police officer
standing at his side, hurls Orthodox doctrine at a driver for running
an amber light, the driver could foreseeably be placed in such a
position. Moreover, simply duplicating the practice with Buddhist

68.
69.
70.

Titov, supra note 65.
Id.
KONST. RF art. 29(3).
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monks or Muslim imams does nothing to relieve this burden on
freedom from coercion or to correct the ensuing inequality and
government endorsement of one or more select religions. The issues
arising from the land transfer for a summer residence likewise raise
red flags concerning preferential treatment, the flaunting of
constitutional and federal law, and a blurring of the requisite line
between church and state.
It is important to recall that these incidents represent the
“lighter” side of the Russian government’s preference for the ROC.
The following subpart attempts to address some of the more
fundamental flaws with Medvedev’s approach to managing church–
state relations and the more ominous indications that Russia is
slipping further afield from its constitutional secularism.
B. Bigger “Favors” Signal Bigger Problems
The pattern of favoring the ROC does little to bolster confidence
in the Medvedev government’s ability to safeguard separation of
church and state in Russia. In fact, the government’s approach
represents a further deepening of the special benefits and treatment
bestowed on the ROC by Putin during his two terms as President. As
Nikolai Mitrokhin observed, “Kirill has already received more from
Medvedev than [Patriarch Alexy II] got from Putin during his whole
presidency.”71 In Patriarch Kirill’s mind, these benefits—akin to the
prior practice of government institutions adopting patron saints and
official prayers, and building churches within state owned
structures72—are indicative of legitimate “partnership” and “fruitful
cooperation”73 between the government and the Church. Notably,
according to Kirill, the “absence of such agreements with certain
other religious organizations active in Russia is not evidence of
discrimination.”74
Still, even as Mitrokhin concludes that the ROC has made
further inroads under Medvedev, he contends that Kirill’s influence
reaches “over a very narrow sphere—education, culture,

71.
Brian Whitmore, Russia’s Patriarch Increasingly Becoming Major Force in
Politics, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Sep. 6, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/
Russias_Patriarch_Increasingly_Becoming_Major_Force_In_Politics/1815832.html.
72.
Blitt, supra note 2, at 740–41.
73.
Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Orthodox Church Elects Outspoken Patriarch,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A10. Medvedev has also invoked the benefits of “fruitful
cooperation” between state and church. Id. “President Dmitry A. Medvedev sent a
greeting, which was read out by his chief of staff, Sergei Naryshkin: ‘I am confident
that [Kirill’s election as Patriarch] will encourage fruitful cooperation between the
Russian Orthodox Church and the state.’” Id.
74.
Letter from Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, to
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Letter from Kirill],
available at http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/80.aspx#5.
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spirituality—but not more than this.”75 Irina Papkova, writing only
two years ago, similarly concluded that the ROC is
unable to exercise real social or political influence . . . at least where it
concerns the federal plane of Russian life . . . the patriarchate has been
unable to persuade the federal government to implement any of its
legislative or policy proposals; the latest spectacular failure in this
regard has been the attempt to obtain federal approval for the
introduction of Orthodox education in public schools.76

Kirill himself has expressed revulsion at the slightest
implication that the ROC might enjoy anything approaching the
status of an official church. Writing in 2005 to then U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice, Kirill demurred that there “are absolutely no
grounds” to make such an assertion because ROC “clergy do not
participate in the work of the state organs or political parties and
movements,” and the Church operates without state funding of
religious activity.77
Despite these arguments downplaying the extent of the ROC’s
influence on Russian policy, the evidence presented below indicates
that it is no longer tenable to profess that the clergy do not
participate in the work of the state organs or that the Church
operates without state funding.78 Furthermore, these examples make
the case that the Church increasingly is wielding its influence beyond
the confines of Mitrokhin’s narrow sphere (which already challenges
Russia’s constitutional order) to successfully advance its legislative
and policy vision. To prove this point, the next subpart examines
three major developments under the Medvedev–Kirill partnership:
the role of religion in Russia’s military; the role of religion in Russia’s
public education system; and the decision by United Russia, the
dominant political party, to authorize ROC review of all pending
federal legislation.

75.
Whitmore, supra note 71.
76.
Irina Papkova, The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia, and:
Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism, and:
Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’: Sovremennoe sostoianie i aktual’nye problemy [The
Russian Orthodox Church: Contemporary Condition and Current Problems], 9 KRITIKA:
EXPLORATIONS IN RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN HISTORY 481, 483, 485 (2008).
77.
Letter from Kirill, supra note 74.
78.
Arguing that the Church operates without state funding “of religious
activities” is disingenuous from the outset because government grants for nonreligious
activities free the Church to redirect its own internal funds towards religious activities.
See Russian Religious Organizations Likely to Gain Right for State Help, INTERFAX,
Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=6945 [hereinafter
Right for State Help] (“The amendments aim at stimulating charitable activities of
religious organizations. Having them adopted, parishes of the Russian Church would
be able to get money allocated by the government for prevention of abortions and
support of young families on priority basis, it would be easier for them to get
premises. . . .”).
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To understand the extent of the ROC’s growing political
muscularity, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev’s open-ended vision of
“noninterference” in the context of church–state relations is
instructive:
And this is what we call noninterference: We on our side do not
interfere . . . into concrete political affairs. Which does not mean that
the Church does not express views on various political and social issues.
On the contrary, the Church is free to explore not only purely
theological or moral themes, but also themes related to history, related
to present political situations, [and] to the future. And this is what I
call noninterference.79

Hilarion’s assessment is also in keeping with the nonexhaustive
list of areas in which the ROC cooperates with the government under
its Bases of the Social Concept text.80 According to this official
Church document, “dialogue [is permitted] with governmental bodies
of all branches and levels on issues important for the Church and
society, including the development of appropriate laws, by-laws,
instructions and decisions”; in addition, cooperation is permitted “in
some other areas if it contributes to the fulfillment of the [Church’s]
tasks.”81 In contrast to the wide-open playing field of sixteen
enumerated but broad areas where the ROC affirmatively permits
itself to cooperate with the government, it only forecloses cooperation
in three areas: “a) political struggle, election agitation, campaigns in
support of particular political parties and public and political leaders;
b) waging civil war or aggressive external war; [and] c) direct
participation in intelligence and any other activity that demands
secrecy by law even in making one’s confession or reporting to the
church authorities.”82
The Church’s success in policing its
noncooperation in these latter three areas is debatable at best,
particularly in light of Patriarch Alexy’s not-too-tacit endorsement of
candidate Medvedev as Putin’s handpicked successor during the 2008

79.
Russian Archbishop Describes Limits of Noninterference in Church–State
Ties, RIA NOVOSTI (Sept. 18, 2009), http://en.rian.ru/valdai/20090918/156176475.html.
Hilarion replaced Kirill as head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s external relations
department following Kirill’s election to Patriarch. Chairman of the Moscow
Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations—Metropolitan Hilarion of
Volokolamsk, RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF THE DEP’T FOR
EXTERNAL CHURCH REL., http://www.mospat.ru/en/decr-chairman/ (last visited Oct. 15,
2010).
80.
See Russian Orthodox Church, The Bases of the Social Concept, RUSSIAN
ORTHODOX CHURCH: OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF THE DEP’T FOR EXTERNAL CHURCH REL.,
http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Bases of the Social Concept].
81.
Id. art. III.8.
82.
Id.
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presidential election83 and the Church’s virtual endorsement of
Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya.84
1.

The Burgeoning Military–Orthodox Complex

Full military honors, including a brass band, greeted Patriarch
Kirill on his visit to Russia’s largest shipyard, in Severodvinsk.85
After strolling past a row of sailors in dress uniform, Kirill boarded a
nuclear submarine and presented the crew with an icon of the Mother
of God.86 Later, during his address to the shipyard workers, Kirill
proclaimed that Orthodox Christian values should be used to
reinforce Russia’s defense capabilities: “You should not be ashamed of
going to church and teaching the Orthodox faith to your
children. . . . Then we shall have something to defend with our
missiles.”87 On an earlier visit to Russian sailors stationed in
Sevastopol, the headquarters for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Kirill
stressed the need to offer spiritual support to the military: “For
warriors to be capable of [sacrificing their lives], we must support
them with our prayers, while clergymen should be working with the
armed forces.”88
In another ceremony held at the Strategic Missile Forces
Academy in Moscow, Patriarch Kirill presented Lieutenant General
Andrey Shvaichenko, Commander of the Missile Forces, with a
banner emblazoned with the image of the Holy Great Martyr
Barbara.89 Kirill opined that “such dangerous weapon [sic] can be
given only to clean hands—hands of people with clear mind, ardent
love to Motherland, responsibility for their work before God and
people.”90 According to Kirill, the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) was
the first branch of Russia’s military to undertake systematic

83.
Sophia Kishkovsky, Russia’s Religious Leaders Congratulate Putin Heir
Medvedev, ECUMENICAL NEWS INT’L, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.eni.ch/featured/
article.php?id=1710. On election day in 2008, before a gaggle of journalists,
microphones, and video cameras, Alexy expressed his wish that the next president
“continue the course carried out” by President Putin. Id.
84.
Blitt, supra note 2, at 726. The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the
Conference of European Churches (CEC) publicly criticized the ROC’s position in this
conflict. Edmund Doogue, As Moscow Continues Attacks Churches Speak Out for Chechen
Civilians, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Nov. 1, 1999, http://www.christianitytoday.com/
ct/1999/novemberweb-only/14.0c.html.
85.
Whitmore, supra note 71.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Roger McDermott, Medvedev “Sanctifies” the Russian Army, EURASIA DAILY
MONITOR, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/show
Article3.cfm?article_id=17894.
89.
Patriarch Kirill Awarded Strategic Missile Forces to St. Barbara Pennant,
INTERFAX, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=6718.
90.
Id.
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cooperation with the ROC because of the SMF’s strategic importance
to the nation’s defense.91 The Patriarch also reminded the audience
that the Church had been teaching Orthodox culture at the Academy
for thirteen years and that over 1,600 officers and members of their
families had graduated from that program.92
These episodes, with their heady mix of military hardware and
Orthodox pageantry, further complicate the entanglement of church
and state. According to Putin’s vision, “traditional faiths” and
Russia’s nuclear missile shield represented the twin “components
that strengthen Russian statehood and create necessary
preconditions for internal and external security of the country.”93
Thus, under Putin, practices including the blessing of the President’s
nuclear launch code briefcase94 and the sprinkling of holy water by a
ROC priest on a S-400 Triumph surface-to-air missile system during
a ceremony broadcast on national television95 became commonplace,
ostensibly to strengthen statehood and state security. Remarkably,
despite the Church’s vehement objection to “consecrat[ing] places that
can serve a ‘double purpose’ and establishments directly or indirectly
encouraging sin,”96 no high-level ROC priest has objected to
sanctifying weapons of mass destruction97 or the successor agency to
the KGB, the institution responsible for single-handedly defiling and
laying waste to the Church under Soviet rule.98 Moreover, neither
the government nor the ROC has expressed any reservation over the
constitutionality of their ongoing comingling within the military
realm.
By mid-2009—and thanks in part to the situation described
above—another longstanding effort by the ROC to further embed
itself within the military appeared to bear fruit. During a meeting
with religious and government officials, Medvedev announced his
intention to support on “an ongoing basis the work of chaplains from

91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Zarakhovich, supra note 14; Fred Weir, Russia’s Orthodox Church Regains
Lost Ground, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 14, 2007, at 6.
94.
Sharon LaFraniere, Russia’s Well-Connected Patriarch: As Church Enjoys
Revival of Influence, Its Past Remains Clouded, WASH. POST, May 23, 2002, at A1.
95.
Andrew Higgins, Putin and Orthodox Church Cement Power in Russia,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at A1.
96.
Patriarch Kirill Believes It Unacceptable to Consecrate Nightclubs and
Restaurants, INTERFAX, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=
news&div=6770. For Kirill, places that can serve a “double purpose” appear limited to
“night clubs, discos, restaurants, [and] shops selling dubious production.” Id.
97.
For example, when asked whether he thought it was inappropriate for the
Church to bless “all kinds of weapons,” Kirill replied, “[p]riests do that when they are
asked.” Interview with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Kyrill [sic]: ‘The Bible Calls it a
Sin,’ SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
0,1518,527618-2,00.html.
98.
Blitt, supra note 2, at 713–15.
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our traditional Russian faiths in our Armed Forces.”99 This sea
change in policy—pursued by the ROC during the eight years of
Putin’s rule but never officially attained100—signals a dramatic
deepening of church–state cooperation under the new President. The
Church’s fervor for accessing the military is in part fueled by stories
such as one told by Vsevolod Chaplin, now head of the ROC’s
department for church–society relations:
Metropolitan Kirill and me [sic] once were visiting the Presidential
Administration. We disputed over teaching religion in school. Several
officials started persuading us that it was absolutely premature,
because “people were not ready and would not understand it.” As usual
the disputes were continued in the hall. Two men of a military poise
were passing by. They listened out to our talk. Suddenly one of them
said: I am sorry, maybe it’s none of our business . . . But all our officers
think the law of the Lord should be taught, and that is all! What are
we discussing all these years?101

In Medvedev’s view, the new chaplaincy program is intended to “help
strengthen the moral and spiritual foundations of [Russian] society,”
as well its “multiethnic and multireligious” unity.102 However, some
critics of the program have voiced concern that the ROC is better
situated than other “traditional” faiths to capitalize on statesanctioned access to the military, in part because of its existing
missionary posture103 and “nationwide infrastructure of seminaries

99.
President Dmitry Medvedev, Opening Remarks at Meeting on Teaching the
Fundamentals of Religious Culture and Secular Ethics in Schools, and the Introduction
of a Chaplains Institute in the Armed Forces (July 21, 2009) [hereinafter Medvedev
Opening Remarks], available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/07/
21/1141_type84779_220010.shtml.
100.
Even prior to Medvedev’s formal approval of military chaplains, over 2,000
Orthodox priests ministered to soldiers on a voluntary, unofficial basis. Blitt, supra
note 2, at 741. This allowed for a situation whereby “[o]nly the Orthodox clergy [were]
entitled to give ecclesiastic guidance to the military.” Zarakhovich, supra note 14; see
also Anastasiya Lebedev, Schools Told to Give Orthodox Lessons, MOSCOW TIMES, Aug.
31, 2006 (acknowledging that “Orthodox priests already preach informally in many
units” of the Russian military); Igor Plugatarev, The Church and the Priest in the Army
Are More Important than Food and Drink, DEF. & SEC. (Rus.), Dec. 30, 2009
(estimating that before the chaplaincy agreement, “530 temples on the territories of the
military units of the Defense Ministry” already housed “850 permanent priests”).
101.
Vsevolod Chaplin, “Scraps,” INTERFAX, Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.interfaxreligion.com/?act=mosaic&div=18.
102.
Medvedev Opening Remarks, supra note 99.
103.
The Moscow Patriarchate has a standalone department that deals uniquely
with the Russian military and law enforcement. See Krainova, supra note 58
(mentioning the “Moscow Patriarchate’s department on cooperation with military
forces and law enforcement agencies”). For a recent, if combative, interview with the
head of this department, Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov, see Plugatarev, supra note 100.
“The period between 1990 and 2000 gave [the] ROC enough strength and power to
allow her [to] undertake wide-spread social activity . . . . The Missionary Department of
ROC was established in end-1995 [sic] and the Russian Orthodox church initiated a
new stage in missionary practice and missionary theology.” Valentin Kozhuharov,
Mission in an Orthodox Christian Context: Witnessing Christ as Pastoral Responsibility 2
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and colleges to train priests for such work,” something the Muslim,
Jewish, and Buddhist faiths do not share.104 This head start has in
turn prompted concern that members of the military who adhere to
other faiths will either go without spiritual care or be led to
Orthodoxy as a more accessible alternative.105
Even if the three other “traditional” religious groups manage to
train and field their own chaplains, the state is poised to reject their
admission into the military. The terms governing the chaplaincy
program require adherents of a “traditional” religious faith to account
for 10 percent of a military unit before the state will authorize an
official chaplain.106 According to a recent Russian Defense Ministry
survey, 83 percent of soldiers identifying themselves as religious
Based on this official government
adherents are Orthodox.107
statistic, it appears unlikely that any of the “traditional” religious
minorities will be able to satisfy the 10 percent per unit bar with any
regularity.108
In addition to being criticized as “laden with errors and insulting
remarks against . . . religious associations that do not belong to
the . . . four ‘traditional’ religions,’”109 the military’s data on

(Mar. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.edinburgh2010.org/fileadmin/files/
edinburgh2010/files/pdf/Valentin%20Kozhuharov%202009-4-30.pdf; see also, Valentin
Kozhuharov, Theological Reflections on the Missionary Activity of the Russian Orthodox
Church, 95 INT’L REV. OF MISSION 371, 376 (2006).
104.
Robert Parsons, Russia: Muslims Oppose Bill to Add Chaplains to Army,
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1066820.html. Islam and Judaism do not maintain a “priesthood” as such. Paul
Goble, Muslim Faithful Outnumber Orthodox Believers in Russian Military District,
WORLD SEC. NETWORK (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/
showArticle3.cfm?article_id=18214.
105.
See Training Centers to Prepare Priests for Russian Army, RIA NOVOSTI,
Feb. 2, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100202/157755055.html (reporting that 83
percent of servicemen identify as Orthodox Christians, and noting Medvedev’s support
for “a project to restore full-scale military priesthood”); Goble, supra note 104
(discussing the possibility that the percentage of Orthodox Christian servicemen is
significantly lower than what the government reports).
106.
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 276
(2010), http://www.uscirf.gov/images/annual%20report%202010.pdf.
107.
Id. “The Armed Forces Sociological Center says more than 70% of Russia’s
military personnel consider themselves religious. About 80% of them identify
themselves as Orthodox Christians, about 13% as Muslims, about 3% as Buddhists,
and 4% as followers of other faiths.” Orthodox Church to Appoint 400 Priests as
Military Chaplains, INTERFAX, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.interfax-religion.com/
?act=news&div= 6891.
108.
According to one critic, “Most likely, everybody, other than Russian
Orthodox parishioners, will be having a problem. I doubt even the Muslims will
number the required 10%.” Anatoly Pchelintsev, Religious Strife May Hit the Army,
DEF. & SEC. (Rus.), Feb. 3, 2010.
109.
Open Letter from the Slavic Center for Law & Justice and the Institute of
Religion & Law, to the Minister of Defense [hereinafter Open Letter from the Slavic
Center for Law & Justice], available at http://www.sclj.org/resources/10_0217LettertoMOD.htm.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1649556

1356

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

[Vol. 43:1337

religiosity appears to conflict with a very different picture being
painted by several media sources. According to these reports, Muslim
citizens of Russia are predicted to “make up a majority of Russia’s
conscript army” in the near future,110 in part “because an everincreasing fraction of the country’s 18 year olds is drawn from
This trend is partially
historically Muslim nationalities.”111
attributed to the “continuous demographic decline” suffered by
Russia’s non-Muslim population since 1995.112 Indeed, the Russian
military itself has conceded that in at least one area—the Volga–Ural
Military District—the majority of troops are in fact Muslim.113
Against this backdrop, the 10 percent hurdle endorsed by
Medvedev coincidentally marries well with the ROC’s desire to retain
a monopoly—or at least a very tightly guarded oligopoly—over access
to the Russian military. As early as 1995, the Moscow Patriarchate
told military officials that if its access to the armed services could not
be exclusive, only Muslim clerics should be tolerated, and no other
religions should be permitted to “penetrate” fighting units.114
Patriarch Kirill, a longstanding advocate of inserting Orthodox
clergy into Russia’s military, was quick to praise Medvedev’s plan to
admit clergy into the ranks of the military. Shortly after the
President’s historic proclamation, Defense Minister Anatoly
Serdyukov announced that he would “hire up to 250 clerics and would
pay their salaries.”115 By December 2009, thirty ROC priests were
already selected, and some dispatched, to serve at Russian military
bases, including in the North Caucasus.116 According to Deputy
Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov, the military anticipates integrating

110.
Michael Mainville, Russia Has a Muslim Dilemma: Ethnic Russians Hostile
to Muslims, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2006, at A17; see also Rozan Yunos & Bandar Seri
Begawan, Russia 20% Muslim by 2020, BRUNEI TIMES, July 27, 2007, available at
http://www.bt.com.bn/features/2007/07/27/russia_20_muslim_by_2020 (noting that by
2020, Muslims may make up one-fifth of Russia’s population).
111.
Goble, supra note 104.
112.
See Nicholas Eberstadt, Drunken Nation: Russia’s Depopulation Bomb, 171
WORLD AFF. 51, 53 (2009) (noting that if demographic projections for Russia made by
the UN Population Division and U.S. Bureau of the Census “turn out to be relatively
accurate . . . the Russian Federation will have experienced over thirty years of
continuous demographic decline by 2025”).
113.
Volga–Urals Military District Has More Muslims than Orthodox, INTERFAX,
Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=6914.
114.
ZOE KNOX, RUSSIAN SOCIETY AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH: RELIGION IN
RUSSIA AFTER COMMUNISM 125 (2005).
115.
Nabi Abdullaev, Medvedev Backs More Religion in Class, Army, MOSCOW
TIMES, July 22, 2009, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/
medvedev-backs-more-religion-in-class-army/379721.html; see also Orthodoxy and
Other Faiths to Be Taught in Russian Schools Voluntarily, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), July
22, 2009 (noting events and policies that may lead to greater religious discrimination).
116.
Russia Restores Full-Scale Military Priesthood, RIA NOVOSTI, Dec. 8, 2009,
http://rianovosti.com/ Religion/20091208/157158959.html.
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chaplains into all regions and military districts by the end of 2010.117
The state, therefore, is now paying the ROC directly for its religious
activities, and the ROC’s priests, in turn, have become agents of the
state.118
Much of the development of the chaplain system is taking place
by administrative decree, outside formal legislative channels. This
procedure has given rise to concerns over the implementation of the
framework that will govern rights and obligations of clergy, their
responsibilities, and their competences.119 As of January 2010, the
Russian Parliament is reportedly “preparing a special law on the
For its part, the Church
priesthood in the armed forces.”120
reportedly is preparing “a textbook of Orthodox Christian culture for
conscript servicemen” and is developing methods for counteracting
the “penetration of totalitarian sects, especially neo-pagans, to the
army.”121
Putting aside the 10 percent rule for “traditional” faiths and the
methods used to implement the program, the most troubling aspect of
the military chaplain program stems from its confirmation that the
preambulary distinction between “traditional” and “nontraditional”
faiths contained in the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience has
become the law of the land.122 As a consequence of this distortion, the
President is able to freely divide religious groups into three distinct
tiers, with each assigned a varying degree of privilege or lack thereof:
first, the Russian Orthodox Church; second, the other “traditional”
faiths, which are afforded the opportunity to operate with the
blessing of the government, at least on paper; and finally, the socalled nontraditional faiths, which are saddled with governmentsanctioned barriers of discrimination that obstruct the ability to
practice faith and service communities freely and equally. By giving
legal effect to the distinction between “traditional” and
“nontraditional” religious groups under Russia’s plan for military

117.
Russia and CIS News Summary for Wednesday, ITAR-TASS, Feb. 18, 2010.
118.
To underscore the increasingly common phenomenon of state funding of the
ROC’s activities, plans are underway to authorize government funding for ROC
parishes engaged in efforts to prevent abortions and “support . . . young families on a
priority basis.” Right for State Help, supra note 78.
119.
In February 2010, the government approved the Statute on the Functional
Responsibilities of the Assistant Commander of the Military Unit for Working with
Faithful Soldiers in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Open Letter from the
Slavic Center for Law & Justice, supra note 109.
120.
Sergey Borisov, ROAR: “The Best of the Best” to Serve as Chaplains in
Russian Army, RT, Jan. 6, 2010, http://rt.com/Politics/2010-01-06/russian-armychaplains-press.html.
121.
Igor Yegorov, Priests Will Be Drafted into the Russian Army?, DEF. & SEC.,
Feb. 3, 2010.
122.
For additional discussion on the impact of the 1997 Law on Freedom of
Conscience, see Blitt, supra note 2, at 733–34. See also infra Part III.B (discussing
implications of distinction between “traditional” and “nontraditional faiths”).
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chaplains, the program facially discriminates against certain
religions without anything more than a preambulary reference as the
basis for establishing such a distinction in the first instance. As
currently implemented, the program goes beyond what President
Putin permitted123 and stands starkly at odds with the Constitution’s
guarantees of equality, nondiscrimination, and freedom of religion.
2.

On Religion in Schools

During his address announcing the military chaplain program,
Medvedev also endorsed another long-debated hot-button issue:
teaching the fundamentals of religious culture and secular ethics in
Russia’s schools.124
The ROC has for many years advocated
introducing such a course, as an opportunity to infuse the state’s
educational curriculum with traditional Orthodox values.125 In the
official view of the Church,
it is desirable that the entire educational system should be built on
religious principles and based on Christian values. . . . The danger of
occult and neo-heathen influences and destructive sects penetrating
into the secular school should not be ignored either, as under their
impact a child can be lost for himself, for his family and for society.126

In vowing to allow religious instruction in public schools,
Medvedev stated that the new educational program would adhere to
“fundamental constitutional provisions at every stage.”127 However,
implementation of the program is being driven by input from the
representatives of only designated traditional religions, thus omitting
from the outset all other so-called nontraditional faiths.128 Moreover,
Medvedev’s promise that “every legislative act in this area will have
to be appraised by experts”129 offers little assurance for compliance
with constitutional or human rights norms because Russia’s record is,
at best, mixed when it comes to employing “experts” to reach
“objective” decisions. For example, in February 2009, the Justice

123.
By virtue of being formalized and approved under Medvedev, the
chaplaincy program goes beyond anything Putin authorized. See, e.g., Blitt, supra note
2, at 733–34 (noting Putin’s comments that the law does not give special privileges to
the ROC).
124.
Medvedev Opening Remarks, supra note 99.
125.
See generally Perry L. Glanzer & Konstantin Petrenko, Religion and
Education in Post-Communist Russia: Russia’s Evolving Church–State Relations, 49 J.
CHURCH & ST. 53 (2007) (providing a detailed historical account of religious education
in post-Soviet Russia).
126.
Bases of the Social Concept, supra note 80, art. 14(3).
127.
Medvedev Opening Remarks, supra note 99.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
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Ministry established an Expert Religious Studies Council.130 The
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
reported that this Council has “wide powers to recommend
investigations of religious groups during the registration procedure,
to assess if a registered community’s activity is in accord with its
charter, and to ascertain if an organization, one of its members, or the
literature it produces or distributes is extremist.”131 Yet, the Council
is chaired by Aleksandr Dvorkin, an individual who lacks academic
credentials as a religion specialist and is known as “Russia’s most
prominent ‘anti-cult’ activist.”132 Other members of the Council
include five ROC-affiliated individuals known for their “anti-sect”
activities and attacks on the Protestant faith.133
Only implementation of the new curriculum will reveal to what
extent—if at all—the ROC exercises control over content, the degree
to which students are able to avail themselves of any “secular ethics”
component, and whether or not exemptions and other
accommodations are forthcoming for nonbelievers or adherents to
“nontraditional” faiths.134 However, like its counterpart plan for
establishing a military chaplaincy—and based on the current

130.
Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Notorious “Anti-Cultists” on New “Inquisition,”
FORUM 18 (Nor.), May 27, 2009, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1300.
131.
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 106, at 279.
132.
Id. During one radio interview, Dvorkin asserted that the “tiny, totalitarian
Church of Scientology was the government religion of the United States.” Id.
133.
Id.; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at
181–82
(2009),
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/AR2009/russia.pdf.
Julie
Elkner
attributes much of the “responsibility for the increasing religious tensions” during the
early 1990s to the anti-cult movement and to “leading anti-cult crusader” Dvorkin
specifically:
Dvorkin has been the key agitator responsible for popularising the new term
‘totalitarian sects,’ thereby furnishing the would-be defenders of Russia’s
spiritual security with one of their chief bugbears. . . . The term was soon
picked up by the Moscow Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church, some
representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and several Protestant
Churches, and the media, as a convenient and suitably sensationalist and
emotive—even ‘politically correct’—catch-all term for the multitude of new
religious movements, many of them foreign, that had become active in Russia.
Julie Elkner, Constructing the Chekist: The Cult of State Security in Soviet and PostSoviet Russia 259–60 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kings College,
University of Cambridge) (on file with the author).
134.
If the new program mirrors past experiences, infringements of individual
human rights and Russia’s Constitution seem likely. See, e.g., Anastasiya Lebedev,
Lesson in Nativity Cards and the Constitution, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006
(discussing debate among religious leaders about religion in schools); Svetlana
Osadchuk, Schoolboy Takes Unorthodox Stand, MOSCOW TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007
(reporting physical assault by students on another student who refused to take part in
church services); Geraldine Fagan, Patchy Local Provision of Orthodox Culture Classes,
FORUM 18, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1022
(reporting physical assault by students on a school boy who refused to cross himself
before prayer led by an ROC priest).
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discourse and track record of previous efforts such as the
“Foundations of the Orthodox Culture” course135—the shape of this
program seems fated to exclude religious faiths deemed
nontraditional136 and thus create another fault line of inequality and
discrimination for religious minorities and nonbelievers.
The
program also seems poised to challenge conventional science,
including evolution. According to Metropolitan Hilarion, “[t]he time
has come for the monopoly of Darwinism and the deceptive idea that
science in general contradicts religion. These ideas should be left in
the past. . . . Darwin’s theory remains a theory. This means it should
be taught to children as one of several theories, but children should
know of other theories too.”137 Moreover, the ROC continues to
advocate that all students—regardless of religious persuasion—be
exposed to the specifics of “Orthodox culture” in some standalone
framework: “the rising generation of citizens cannot fail to have basic
notions of . . . icon painting, church architecture, and the historical
path of the Orthodox Church.”138
In the face of looming changes to Russia’s public school
curriculum—religion classes might be expanded nationwide as early
as 2012139—it is worth recalling that the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) already establishes that
all governments must “take care that information or knowledge
included in [any religious instruction sponsored by the state] is
conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner.” The
ECtHR further prohibits the state from “pursu[ing] an aim of
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’
religious and philosophical convictions.”140 This bar may be even

135.
See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 134 (discussing opposition to implementation of
the “Foundations of the Orthodox Culture” course).
136.
Cf. Mansur Mirovalev, Russian Pupils to Have Choice of Religion, Ethics
Classes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2009, at 4 (noting that students may choose between
studying Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, or Judaism). Of course, even then,
those non-ROC “traditional” religions may be subject to a 10 percent bar or some other
device that renders an outcome similar to that emerging with the military chaplaincy
plan.
137.
Conor Humphries, Russia Church Wants End to Darwin School “Monopoly,”
REUTERS, June 10, 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINTRE6584JX20100609.
138.
"*$-%*-, ./0+/'0+%1 % '023 4#0% !%-%)) – “56'20$%37”: “82-+/'&*3 9%6&:
;/)9&* <=$: 0)#92&%27” [Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Kirill to Izvestiya:
“Church Life Should Be Service”], IZVESTIYA (Moscow), May 12, 2009 [hereinafter
Patriarch Kirill to Izvestiya] (“[S]imilar knowledge about the country’s other traditional
religions can be included in history and social studies courses.” (quoting Patriach
Kirill) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139.
Mirovalev, supra note 136, at 4.
140.
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen & Pedersen v. Denmark, App. Nos. 5095/71,
5920/72, 5926/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, ¶ 53 (1976). Human Rights Comm., Views of
the Human Rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 14.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003 (Nov.
23, 2004) (showing that the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) addressed the same

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1649556

2010]

A Recipe for the Continuing Decline of Secular Russia

1361

higher when applied to Russia given that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence
on this issue relates to Norway, a country with an official state
church; Russia, in contrast, remains—at least on paper—
constitutionally secular.141
The agreement to allow religious instruction in public schools for
“traditional” religions also is troubling because it dovetails with
another church–state alliance aimed at combating the “falsification of
history.”142 In May 2009, Medvedev announced the formation of a
presidential commission to “Counter Attempts to Falsify History to
the Detriment of Russia’s Interests.”143 The raison d’être for the
commission is explained by Presidential Chief of Staff and
Commission Chair Sergei Naryshkin:
Russia, as historic successor of the Soviet Union, is provocatively
blamed for events and tragedies of those years, which prepares a base
for making claims against our country: political, financial and
territorial. At the enemies’ order, attempts are being made to distort
events and facts of other periods in the development of the Russian
state.144

According to others, the commission is part of a more sinister effort to
introduce an official version of history, backed by the threat of
criminal sanction for those who diverge from the government’s
view.145 Supporting this perspective is the fact that the twenty-eightmember commission consists of “Kremlin-friendly conservatives”146—

issue three years prior to the European Court). The HRC found that Norway’s religious
curriculum could not “be said to meet the requirement of being delivered in a neutral
and objective way” unless it maintained a system of exemptions that was neutral and
objective. Id. The HRC concluded that requiring parents to “acquaint themselves with
[a] subject . . . clearly of a religious nature” to secure an exemption was a “considerable
burden.” Id.
141.
Blitt, supra note 2, at 767.
142.
Dmitry Medvedev Signed an Executive Order on the Presidential
Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the
Detriment of Russia’s Interests, PRESIDENT OF RUSS. OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (May 19,
2009), http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/news/2009/05/216503.shtml.
143.
Id.; see also Interview by Vitaly Abramov, Editor-in-Chief, Izvestiya (May
7, 1010), available at http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/295 (detailing President
Medvedev’s personal views on the commission); James Rodgers, Russia Acts Against
‘False’
History,
BBC
NEWS,
July
24,
2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/8166020.stm (labeling the new body a “Historical Truth Commission”); Russia
Sets Up Commission to Prevent Falsification of History, RIA NOVOSTI, May 19, 2009,
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090519/155041940.html (providing another account of the
commission’s purpose).
144.
Commission on Counteracting History Falsification Meets in Kremlin, ITARTASS, Aug. 28, 2009.
145.
Irina Filatova, Medvedev’s New Russian Orthodoxy, GUARDIAN, May 21,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/21/russia-medvedev-history.
146.
Anne Garrels, Artistic Freedoms Under Fire in Russian Trial, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (June 4, 2009) (available for download on iTunes).
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mostly government officials—and includes only three historians.147
According to another point of view, “So many people are speaking
about strong, Orthodox Russia, military power. . . . The commission
is partly a response to this atmosphere.”148 Indeed, the ROC has
gotten behind the government effort to combat “falsification”: shortly
after the commission’s establishment, Patriarch Kirill, on a visit to
Ukraine, condemned Ukrainian attempts to falsify history, “echoing
earlier Kremlin criticism of Ukraine’s campaign to have the
Holodomor, a Stalin-era famine that killed millions of Ukrainians,
recognized internationally as genocide.”149 In another speech, Kirill
again attacked the supposed falsification of Russian history: “We
must counter every lie. It is gratifying that writers, scholars and
cultural figures . . . will speak against attempts to falsify [our]
history.”150 At Russia’s third World Congress of Compatriots Living
Abroad, a forum established to help preserve and extend “the
Russian-speaking space and propagation of the Russian language and
culture,”151 Kirill participated in discussions concerning “attempts to
falsify [history] to the prejudice of Russia.”152 Despite a public but
very short-lived dustup over Stalin’s historical legacy,153 the

147.
Filatova, supra note 145; see also !/7%00%3 (/ (-/$%'/;210$'%> (/(=$+*7
?*):0%?%+*@%% %0$/-%% ' #A2-< %&$2-20*7 4/00%% [Commission to Counter Attempts to
Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia], PRESIDENT OF RUSS. OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL
(May 19, 2009), http://archive.kremlin.ru/articles/216485.shtml (containing a complete
list of commissioners).
148.
Rodgers, supra note 143.
149.
Claire Bigg, Russian Patriarch’s Visit Creates Storm in Ukraine, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (July 31, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_
Patriarchs_Visit_Creates_Storm_In_Ukraine/1789 959.html; see also Kremlin Works to
Prevent
Falsification
of
History,
VOANEWS.COM,
May
19,
2009,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-19-voa59-68644182.html?refresh=1
(describing the Kremlin’s efforts to suppress historical accounts of World War II
depicting Russian efforts unfavorably).
150.
Attempts to Falsify War History Must Be Resisted—Patriarch, INTERFAX,
Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=6406.
151.
Patriarch Kirill Attends the Opening of the 3d Congress of Compatriots
Living Abroad, RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF THE DEP’T
EXTERNAL CHURCH REL. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.mospat.ru/en/2009/12/01/
news9542/.
152.
Id.
153.
A Mission in the World—Interview by Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk
to Expert Magazine, EXPERT MAG. (Moscow), June 15, 2009, available at
http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/7_7.
Stalin was a monster, a spiritual cripple who created a horrible anti-humane
system of governance built on lies, violence and terror. He unleashed genocide
against his own people . . . . In this respect Stalin is quite like Hitler. Both
brought so much grief into this world . . . . There is no essential difference
between the Butovo firing ground and Buchenwald, between GULAG and
Hitler’s system of death camps.
Id.; Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Patriarch, Praising World War II, Sidesteps Stalin,
HUFFINGTON POST, May 13, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/russian-
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government and Church continue to see eye to eye on the threat of
falsification. In June 2010, at a meeting between the ROC and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parties stressed plans to continue
joint efforts to combat the falsification of history.154 Such efforts to
constrain historical debate based on a government-endorsed narrative
may very well spillover into the religious education realm to limit
competing viewpoints and perspectives on faith in the name of
upholding one religious “truth.”
3.

Advance Church Scrutiny of All Pending Legislation

To be certain, the pro-ROC policies endorsed above represent
significant “concessions from the secular government that [Kirill’s]
predecessors had been trying to obtain for years.”155 However, the
single most revealing recent development is the decision by the
United Russia Party—the party of Putin and Medvedev156—to open
all legislation pending in the Duma for comment by the ROC. This
decision emerged following a meeting between Patriarch Kirill and
two United Russia deputies who were summoned to hear the
Church’s concerns over Russia’s decision to proceed with ratification
of the European Social Charter.157 According to Deputy Andrei
Isayev, “[United Russia] told the patriarch that the ratification of the
charter won’t require any changes in Russian legislature [sic] and

patriarch-praisin_n_575634.html (“When some homegrown historians tell us that the
evil here was no less than [in Nazi Germany], they are not seeing beyond their own
noses, and fail to see the divine horizon beyond their extremely primitive and sinful
analysis.” (quoting Patriarch Metropolitan Kirill) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154.
B/0$/3)/0: XV 6*02;*&%2 4*</C21 D-#((= (/ '6*%7/;210$'%> .5E 4/00%% %
4#00+/1 "-*'/0)*'&/1 82-+'% [Held XV Meeting of the Working Group on Interaction
Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Orthodox Church], RUSSIAN ORTHODOX
CHURCH (June 4, 2010), http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1174038.html.
155.
Andrei Zolotov, Jr., The Tireless Preacher, RIA NOVOSTI, Feb. 2, 2010,
http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?213870-The-Tireless-Preacher.
156.
United Russia holds 315 of the Duma’s 450 seats. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY [CIA], Russia, in The WORLD FACTBOOK (2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
157.
Russia Signs European Social Charter of the Council of Europe, MINISTRY
FOREIGN
AFF.
OF
THE
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
(Sept.
9,
2000),
OF
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/c57668280f98bc3e432
5699c003b6336?OpenDocument; see also Anna Malpas, Vow to Europe to Offer Sex Ed
Angers
Parents,
MOSCOW
TIMES,
June
11,
2009,
available
at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/vow-to-europe-to-offer-sex-ed-angersparents/378472.html (describing a debate weighing morality and sexually transmitted
diseases in school curricula); Public Opinion of Russian Citizens Against Some Points of
the European Social Charter, RUSS.–INFOCENTRE (June 9, 2009), http://www.russiaic.com/rus_inter national/in_depth/920/ (explaining that the ROC is concerned that
ratification of the European Social Charter will require Russia to introduce sex
education courses in school and establish a juvenile justice system that takes discipline
out of the hands of parents). Patriarch Kirill has labeled sex education “a looming evil.”
Malpas, supra.
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won’t lead to circumstances that will frighten the public.”158 At the
same time, Isayev offered that in the future his party “would show
the patriarchate the State Duma’s plan for legislative work and hold
preliminary consultations on all questions that may raise doubts to
avoid mutual misunderstanding.”159 Boris Nemtsov, a former Deputy
Prime Minister and leader of the Solidarity opposition group,
criticized the agreement as running afoul of Russia’s Constitution:
“They can hold discussions with whoever they want, but there is the
Constitution, which says the church and government are separate.”160
This milestone arrangement establishes a seemingly
unprecedented and unlimited privilege for the ROC. Moreover, it
suggests that the ruling party welcomes an end to official
constitutional secularism in Russia. Opening draft legislation to
comment from a single religious group vitiates the constitutional
principles of secularism and separation of church and state,
particularly because no other religious group—“traditional” or
“nontraditional”—has been granted the same opportunity as the
ROC. More revealingly still, Russia’s Public Chamber, an advisory
body made up of prominent individuals and created for the express
purpose of reviewing draft legislation,161 has been prevented from
performing this task since its establishment in 2005.162 Indeed,

158.
Ruling Party Alone at the Top in Russia, ANGUS REID GLOBAL MONITOR
(July
13,
2009),
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/ruling_party_alone_at_
the_top_in_russia/; see also Alexandra Odynova, Orthodox Church Gets a Say on Duma
Bills, MOSCOW TIMES, July 10, 2009, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
news/article/orthodox-church-gets-a-say-on-duma-bills/379444.html (discussing Kirill’s
“angst” over anticipated sex education programs).
159.
Odynova, supra note 158.
160.
Id.
161.
C? C?='/%2',,34 0+)+%' @3//&4/:34 A'7'1+8&& [On the Public Chamber of
the Russian Federation], A'7'1+)*,-4 "+:3, @3//&4/:34 A'7'1+8&& 3% 4 +01')$ 2005 5. N
32-AD (Federal Law No. 32–FZ, 4 Apr. 2005) (explaining that the Chamber is intended
to harmonize social interests of Russian citizens, inter alia, by undertaking a public
assessment of draft laws); Alfred B. Evans, Jr., The First Steps of Russia’s Public
Chamber Representation or Coordination? 16 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 345, 347 (2008);
CIVIC CHAMBER FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, http://www.oprf.ru/en (last visited Oct.
15, 2010); Nikolay Petrov, All Smoke and Mirrors, MOSCOW TIMES, July 20, 2007,
available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/all-smoke-and-mirrors/
195590.html (noting that since its establishment, the Public Chamber (or Civic
Chamber) has been described as “largely a meaningless institution,” “an attempt to
create a dummy of a civil society,” and “a smoke screen for the Kremlin’s increasingly
authoritarian trends”).
162.
See On the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation arts. 6(1), 18(2)
(explaining that the President appoints one-third of the Chamber’s 126 members and
that the Chamber cannot evaluate legislation without the prior authorization of its
governing board); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: RUSSIA (2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136054.htm (noting that
following a 2008 law reiterating the Chamber’s review function—specifically regarding
legislation that restricts individual freedoms—the body still has had no “discernable
effect on the legislative process”); James Richter, The Ministry of Civil Society? The
Public Chambers in the Regions, 56 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 6, 8 (2009)
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following announcement of the United Russia–ROC deal, Alexander
Brod, a human rights activist and Public Chamber member, argued
that the Chamber deserved at least the same privilege as the Church
to preview legislation.163 As part of its response to this newfound
responsibility and other similar relationships, the Moscow
Patriarchate established a “department for church–state relations,”
which interacts with “legislative bodies, political parties, trade
unions . . . and other institutes of the [sic] civil society in the
canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate.”164
Subsequent and related acts have further insinuated the Church
into the temporal policy making process. In December 2009, the ROC
and members of United Russia announced their expectation that the
government would not merely consult with the Church, but “must
jointly decide . . . what their common values are and what
modernization tasks must be accomplished.”165 This announcement
implies that the parties—Church and state—share an equal role in
determining the future course of Russian policy, and it reveals not
only a newly strengthened Church under the leadership of Patriarch
Kirill, but also a more willing governmental partner headed by
President Medvedev. From the perspective of the Church, the
situation is ideal: its independent authority and decision making
capacity are preserved intact, and not co-opted by the government as
under a formal, more unified system of state religion. Yet at the
same time, the Church is able to assert a significant influence on the
policy making process, not only without regard for Russia’s
Constitution, but at the expense of all other religious groups in
Russia.

(suggesting that part of the reason for this failure may be that the Public Chamber
reflects the Kremlin’s effort to “appropriate the rhetoric of civil society to elicit the civic
participation necessary to improve state governance and to construct boundaries
around the public sphere to preserve state sovereignty”); see also Evans, supra note
161, at 358 (asserting that in light of these realities, the Public Chamber, on the whole,
remains an institution either unwilling or unable to effectively scrutinize Kremlinbacked legislative initiatives). A slightly more optimistic, if still tentative, assessment
concludes that the Public Chamber “will likely be able to exert influence ‘at the
margins’, making some difference in the formulation of policies when the most powerful
forces are aligned in such a way as to give the [Chamber] the opportunity to tip the
balance a bit one way or another.” Evans, supra note 161, at 358; see also id. at 355
(showing that even this view reaffirms that the Russian government created the Public
Chamber for the purpose of co-opting civil society “to assist the leadership of the
political regime in pursuing the objectives that it has chosen for society”).
163.
Odynova, supra note 158.
164.
Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate
(DECR)—Background, RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF THE DEP’T
FOR EXTERNAL CHURCH REL., http://www.mospat.ru/en/department/history/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2010).
165.
Church, United Russia Want State–Church Partnership Sealed by Laws,
INTERFAX, Dec. 1, 2009.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1649556

1366

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

[Vol. 43:1337

IV. CONCLUSION
As one of the first acts to inaugurate the second half of his term,
Medvedev signed into law a new public holiday celebrating the
Baptism of Rus.166 This holiday, which takes place on July 28,
commemorates Prince Vladimir’s baptism of medieval Kievan Rus in
988 and underpins the ROC’s ongoing success at adding religious
holidays to Russia’s civil calendar.167 The Baptism of Rus is being
added to a growing list of state-recognized Orthodox celebrations,
including, most recently, the Day of Married Love and Family
Happiness, which coincides with the Orthodox commemoration of
Peter and Fevronia Day, the Orthodox patron saints of married
couples.168 Medvedev’s decision to recognize the Baptism of Rus on
Russia’s civil calendar sparked demands from the leaders of Russia’s
Buddhist and Muslim communities for similar public recognition of
their own religious holidays. The president of the Islamic Committee
of Russia asserted that failure to approve a parallel Muslim holiday
“will underscore what Muslims already feel, that they are secondclass citizens and marginals.”
Likewise, Drikung Kag’yu, a
representative of Russia’s Buddhists reasoned that “justice requires”
a Buddhist public holiday in the face of a holiday for Orthodox
Christians.169
In less than two years, the Medvedev–Kirill partnership has
opened multiple new channels of influence for the ROC in Russian
social and political life, handed the Church its long-coveted prizes of
access to the public education system and the military, and continued
to entrench a discriminatory three-tiered status system for religious
groups.170 These growing channels of influence are also evident in
Russia’s foreign policy, including various initiatives and
constitutionally dubious ROC–state interactions that blur the line
between Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the

166.
A New Memorable Date Has Been Set in Russia’s Calendar—Baptism of
Rus Day, PRESIDENT OF RUSS. OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (June 1, 2010),
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/326.
167.
Blitt, supra note 2, at 742, 743; see also Patriarch Kirill Hopes Day of
Russia’s Baptism to Become State Holiday in Russia and Byelorussia, INTERFAX, July
29, 2009, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=6261 (noting that the Day of
Russia’s Baptism, a religious holiday, may soon be added to the civil calendar).
168.
Russia Marks Day of Married Love and Family Happiness, RIA NOVOSTI,
July 8, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090708/155471052.html.
169.
Paul Goble, Russia’s Muslims and Buddhists Want Public Holidays for
Their
Faiths
Too,
EURASIA
REV.,
May
28,
2010,
available
at
http://www.eurasiareview.com/20100528389/russias-muslims-and-buddhists-wantpublic-holidays-for-their-faiths-too.html.
170.
This system is premised on distinguishing between Russian Orthodoxy,
other “traditional” faiths of Russia (Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism), and so-called
nontraditional religions.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1649556

2010]

A Recipe for the Continuing Decline of Secular Russia

1367

ROC.171 Moreover, the ROC’s influence can be seen in the looming
decision to transfer property confiscated under communist rule back
to religious organizations. Although President Putin refused to take
this initiative, with the help of President Medvedev’s more
accommodating approach, the ROC is poised to become one of
Russia’s largest property owners.172
From this perspective, the recent leadership changes within the
Church and the government have resulted in a deepening of the
entente established between Putin and Alexy. Rather than proceed
with his promise of greater democracy,173 Medvedev has invited the
Church further into the fold. Kirill has not balked at the opportunity.
Consequently, these leaders—and in particular the President174—
have failed in their obligations to afford Russia’s Constitution the
deference owed to it as the nation’s highest law and as required under
Article 15(2):
State government bodies, local self-government bodies, officials, citizens
and their associations shall be obliged to observe the Constitution of the
Russian Federation and laws.175

Although the burgeoning relationship with the state comes at the
expense of respect for principles enshrined in the constitutional text,
Patriarch Kirill considers the current dynamic to be as close as
possible—in “our world spoiled by sin”176—to the historical Byzantine
idea of symphonia, under which church and state stand on equal
footing, each operating autonomously within its respective sphere of
influence:177
[W]e now have the opportunity to get as close as possible to
[symphonia]. Despite all the existing difficulties, the Church today
retains, on the one hand, independence, and on the other—friendly

171.
Providing an analysis of the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in
Russia’s foreign policy is outside the immediate scope of this Article. For more
information on the topic, see Robert C. Blitt, Russia’s “Orthodox” Foreign Policy:
Church–State Cooperation (forthcoming) (on file with author).
172.
Law on Church Property Return Bans Transfer of Exhibits from Museums,
RIA NOVOSTI, May 24, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100524/159132306.html; Putin
Gives Boost to Law on Church Property Return, RIA NOVOSTI, Jan. 14, 2010,
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100114/157543576.html; see also Orthodox Church May
Become One of Largest Proprietors in Russia, ITAR-TASS, Feb. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.acg.ru/english/orthodox_church_may_become_one_of_largest_proprietors_in
_russia.
173.
Shaun Walker, Medvedev Promises New Era for Russian Democracy,
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 13, 2009, at 27. Contra Simon Shuster, Medvedev Dashes Hopes for
More Democracy in Russia, TIME, Oct. 30, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1933251,00.html (illustrating efforts curtailing democratization).
174.
See KONST. RF art. 80 (“[The President] shall be the guarantor of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation and of human and civil rights and freedoms.”).
175.
Id. art. 15(2).
176.
Patriarch Kirill to Izvestiya, supra note 138.
177.
Knox, supra note 10, 575.
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relations with the state. And we should utilize this potential in the
most varied spheres.178

In Kirill’s mind, these “friendly relations” accord fully with the
principle of separation of church and state, yet have the advantage of
avoiding the Church’s submission to the state:
We are not striving to resurrect the role which the Orthodox Church
exercised in the Russian empire. . . .
[T]he Church’s best
representatives were aware of how the Church’s dependence upon the
state, the subjugation of her life to the interests of the state, is so
detrimental to the Church’s own mission. In this sense, the separation
of church and state—regardless of which political system is in effect—is
unquestionably favourable to the Church, and we will insist on this
fundamental principle . . . .179

For the ROC, therefore, separation of church and state is a one-way
affair. It means that the Church—to the exclusion of all other
religious groups180—can press its views on the secular government
“in the most varied spheres,” even to the point of urging policies
contrary to the Russia’s Constitution. At the same time, the state
cannot interfere in the Church’s dealings but is urged to interfere
with or restrict the freedom of other religious groups.181
Ultimately, it matters little whether the degeneration of
secularism, separation of state and religion, equality among religious
faiths, and nondiscrimination derive from symphonia or something
less.182 What matters is that under the current scenario the essence
of the unfolding ROC–state dynamic—premised on the creeping
infusion of religiosity and discriminatory treatment into official state
policy—leaves both parties as willful partners in the ever-worsening
collapse of Russia’s constitutional order and respect for human rights.

178.
Patriarch Kirill to Izvestiya, supra note 138.
179.
Knox, supra note 10, at 580.
180.
Id. at 582 (“[T]he Patriarchate seeks to cooperate with the state on a
remarkably wide range of areas and does not seek to extend this church–state
cooperation to other denominations.”).
181.
See, e.g., Robert C. Blitt, “Babushka Said Two Things—It Will Either Rain
or Snow; It Either Will or Will Not”: An Analysis of the Provisions and Human Rights
Implications of Russia’s New Law on Non-Governmental Organizations as Told
Through Eleven Russian Proverbs, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 79 (2008) (noting the
ROC’s endorsement of cumbersome reporting requirements under Russia’s NGO law
for “nontraditional” religions).
182.
Writing in 2007, John Anderson reasoned that if symphonia did exist under
Alexy and Putin, it was “very much an asymmetric symphonia” favoring the
government. Anderson, supra note 6, at 198 (emphasis added). He added that the
asymmetric symphonia “may become more so should Russia elect a less sympathetic
president in 2008.” Id. The findings presented herein indicate that this has not been
the case. Rather, under Medvedev’s leadership a rebalancing in favor of the Church has
occurred.
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